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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Governance refers to the way an organisation is directed, administrated 
or controlled. It includes the set of rules and regulations that affect the manager’s 
decision and contribute to the way company is perceived by the current and potential 
stakeholders. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as; boards, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures and also 
decision-making assistance on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the 
structure through which the company’s objectives are set and the means of obtaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance. Corporate governance may be the ways of 
bringing the interests of investors and managers into line and ensuring that firms are run 
for the benefit of investors.  
Effective corporate governance mobilises the capital annexed with the 
promotion of efficient use of resources both within the company and the larger 
economy. It also assists in attracting lower cost investment capital by improving 
domestic as well as international investor’s confidence. Good corporate governance 
ensures the accountability of the management and the Board. The Board of directors 
will also ensure legal compliance and take impartial decisions for the betterment of 
the business. It is understood that efficient corporate governance will make it 
difficult for corrupt practices to develop and take root, though it may not eradicate 
them immediately. 
Corporate governance swivel around some important aspects such as Role of board 
of directors, Basic structure of board of directors, its remuneration, Ownership of 
director, Availability of freedom to an enterprise, Role of services of institutional 
directors, Accountability of member of BoD, Financial reporting, Institutionalisation of 
audit functions and linkage with shareholders. Good corporate governance can add value 
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to developing sound corporate management and enriching the results of corporate entities 
for society in general and shareholders in particular to be the beneficiaries.     
The developed countries like US, UK, Germany, Hong Kong and etc. have 
developed different models of corporate governance which now implemented there in 
true spirit. The World Bank also showed interest in this topic and developed a World 
Governance Index (WGI). The objective of this index is to evaluate the corporate 
performance of different countries on the basis of Regulations, Corruption and Rule of 
Law. The results of the index showed that the performer in corporate governance was 
Germany with a score of 90.8 percent and worst performer is Bangladesh with a score of 
24.3.     
Given the state of the economy of Pakistan in 2010, troubled as it is; ideally it 
would be more desirable to look at the governance issues at macro level for Pakistan. The 
financial and administrative turn-around of eight loss-making public sector entities is the 
biggest challenge for the government to improve governance and put national economy 
back on track. As a famous economist, Dr Shahid Javaid Burki—a long observer of 
Pakistan’s economy has recently stated “Pakistan can generate a greater bounce in its 
economy than India by creating better governance. It has occurred before in the 
country’s difficult economic history and could happen again.” (Improved Governance: 
Dawn, 12th, October 2010). 
However, as a starting point, in this paper we look at closely the governance issues 
for the financial sector, a sector which has played a significant role till recent years in 
economic activity of Pakistan. Rehman, et al. (2010) have looked at the issue of 
corporate governance in Chemical and Pharmaceutical sectors of Pakistan and found that 
there is a significant impact of corporate governance on the shareholder’s returns in 
pharmaceutical sector of Pakistan. Corporate governance has become an issue of global 
significance.  The improvement of corporate governance practices is widely recognised 
as one of the essential elements in strengthening the foundation for the long-term 
economic performance of countries and corporations. In Pakistan, the first Code of 
Corporate Governance for Pakistan was finalised and issued by SECP in March 2002. 
Then it was subsequently incorporated in all the listed companies of three stock 
exchanges in Pakistan. In 2004, SECP took the first step to establish the Pakistan Institute 
of Corporate Governance in public private partnership.  
According to ―A Survey of Corporate Governance Practices in Pakistan, 
2007‖, conducted by: International Finance Corporation and SECP, 92 percent 
respondents prepare annual ―Statement of Ethics and Business Policy‖, 48 percent 
had ―Vision and Mission Statement‖, and none of the respondents have Code of 
Corporate Governance. On the other hand, it was also found that 50 percent of the 
corporations in Pakistan did not include non-executive directors in their board of 
directors, 54 percent have not introduced transaction administration procedure, 53 
percent have not implement a formal remuneration system, and 55 percent did not 
have corporate governance improvement plan. Whereas, 31 percent respondents did 
not identify the barriers to improve the corporate governance, 69  percent identified 
the barriers, 42 percent had non availability of qualified staff to implement and 21 
percent did have the claim that corporate governance produces sensitive information 
that cannot be shared with the competitors. 
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Even though many studies have conducted on corporate governance issues in the 
non-financial sectors, a few studies examine the corporate governance issues in the 
banking sector [Wright, et al. (2002); Kinti, et al. (2004); Berger, et al. (2005)]. This 
paper focuses on corporate governance impact on financial sector of Pakistan. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several empirical studies have investigated the association between corporate 
governance and firm performance [Yermack (1996); Claessens, et al. (2000); Klapper 
and Love (2002); Gompers, et al. (2003); Black, et al. (2003); Sanda, et al. (2005)], with 
inconclusive results. Adjaoud, et al. (2007) concluded that there is little evidence of a 
systematic relationship between the characteristics of the board.  Bhagat, et al. (2000) and 
Weir, et al. (1999) experienced a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. Albeit Eisenberg, et al. (1998) observed a negative relationship 
between them. 
Corporate governance contains various aspects of complex regimes as Zingales 
(1998) also examines it as a comprehensively broad, multifaceted notion that is 
enormously relevant, while difficult to define, due to the variety of scope that it 
encompasses. Friend and Lang (1998) examine that shareholders, having high 
concentration in firms, play an important role to control and direct the management to 
take keen interest in benefit of the concentration group. In addition corporate governance 
regimes also allow shareholders to direct the management for betterment of their 
investment. Shleifer, et al. (1997) describe that concentration groups with large share 
holdings; check the manager’s activities better. However, the check and balance not only 
causes to reduce the agency cost but also resolves the issues between managers and 
owners. Furthermore, Williamson (1988) examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and securities.  Jensen (1986) seems to be quite keen to analyse how 
corporate governance directly or indirectly influences the capital structure and firm value. 
While, Driffield, et al. (2007) found that higher ownership concentration has a positive 
impact on capital structure and firm value. In the case of lower ownership concentration, 
the relationship depends upon the strictness of managerial decision making which enforce 
to bring change in the capital structure.  
For the US market, Gompers, et al. (2003) analysed the relationship between 
corporate governance, long-term equity returns, firm value and accounting measures of 
performance, while Rob Bauer, et al. (2004) found combined relationship between 
corporate governance, firm value and equity returns. Substantial differences are found 
between the UK market and the Euro-zone markets. Many studies prove that there is no 
linkage between corporate governance and performance. Beth (2003) concluded that 
there is no impact of director independence on firm performance. Several studies have 
been conducted so far and still going on to examine the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms, but the results are mixed [Kajola et 
al. (2008)].  Anthony, et al. (2007) observed that the sector and country has a significant 
effect while examining the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. 
According to Maria Mahar and Thomas Anderson (2008) there are some 
weaknesses, strengths and economic implications associated with corporate governance 
systems. It is widely believed that good corporate governance is an important factor in 
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improving the value of a firm in both developing and developed financial markets. 
However, the relationship between corporate governance and the value of a firm differs 
in emerging and mature financial markets due to disparate corporate governance 
structures in these markets resulting from dissimilar social, economic and regulatory 
conditions in these countries. There is a need to understand the differences which affect 
the value of a firm for academic investigations, financial and management practices and 
public regulation of corporations and markets.  The variables used by Kashif Rashid 
(2008): price to book value ratio, market capitalisation, gearing ratio, return on total 
assets, shareholder’s concentration (agency cost), CEO duality, board size, and judicial 
and regulatory authority efficiency. Burki and Ahmad (2007) explored the changes of 
corporate governance in Pakistan’s banking sector and its impact on their efficiencies. 
For measuring corporate governance different variables are used by the researchers 
such as Board Size, Board Independence, Board meeting, Ownership structure, Family 
Ownership and Dual role of CEO. A widely debated corporate governance issue is 
whether the two most important positions in a company—the Chairman of the Board and 
the CEO—should be held by two different individuals (a dual leadership structure) or one 
person may be assigned both portfolios (a unitary leadership structure).  
Many studies addressed the CEO duality-performance relationship; with 
inconsistent results [Boyd (1994)]. There is only weak evidence that duality status affects 
long-term performance, after controlling the other factors that might impact the 
performance. [Baliga, et al. (1995)].  Berg, et al. (1978) and Brickley, et al. (1997) 
concluded that there is a chance of agency cost when CEO performs dual role. Therefore, 
the separation of the two positions enhances shareholder value. Fama, et al. (1983) also 
argued that concentration of decision management and decision control in one individual 
reduces a board’s effectiveness in monitoring top management. For example, when a 
CEO doubles as board chairman, this results in conflict of interests and increases agency 
costs.  
A number of empirical studies have been conducted in the US to measure the 
impact of director independence and corporate performance. Some researchers found a 
direct evidence of a relationship between board composition in terms of independence 
and corporate performance. Kesner (1987), studying Fortune 500 companies found a 
positive and significant correlation between proportion of inside directors and two 
indicators of performance: profit margin and return on assets. 
Baysinger, et al. (1985) and Hambrick, et al. (2000) found evidence for the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors to be positively correlated with the 
accounting measure of performance. On the other hand, studies by Klein (1998), Bhagat, 
et al. (1997), and Hermalin, et al. (1991) experienced a high proportion of independent 
directors does not predict a better future accounting performance. Using accounting 
measures Agrawal, et al. (1999) observed a negative relationship between board 
independence and firm’s performance. Jeffrey, et al. (1990) found no evidence in favour 
of outside directors to enhance the firm performance. 
For a better performance of a corporation it is necessary to monitor the operations 
of the firm regularly, it can be done by increasing the board meetings in a given year. The 
frequency of board meeting is an important dimension of board operations [Nikos 
(1999)]. He found the annual number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value. 
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When independent from management, the Chairman can play a pivotal role in giving 
directors (particularly non-executive directors) a strong voice in setting agendas of Board 
meetings, deciding on executive compensation and encouraging meaningful discussions 
in Board meetings.  
Sanda, et al. (2005) and David, et al. (1996) found a positive relationship between 
small-sized boards and corporate performance. Board size is found to be a positively 
correlated with firm value in between-firms tests, and changes in board size are found to 
be positively associated with annual stock returns [Mak
 
and Kusnadi (2005)]. Small 
board of directors is more effective [Yermack (1996)].  Holthausen and Larcker (1993b) 
fail to find consistence evidence of an association between board size and company 
performance.  
Jiang (2004) explored that an ownership structure and firm performance can be 
positive or negative relationship depending upon the sectors and time period.  Jensen, et 
al. (2004) specifically identified that ―the fraction of the equity held by the manager‖ as a 
fundamental to ownership structure. This same rationale has been applied to board 
members as well [Dalton, et al. (2003)]. Officers and directors, in various combinations, 
constitute inside equity holders [Bethel, et al. (1993)]. Dong-Sung, et al. (2007) 
concluded that it is not important in case of Korean firms that who is CEO, but it is 
matter a lot that who the large shareholders. As large is the shareholder ownership it 
influences more on corporate performance. But in case of managerial ownership, it does 
not make any impact on firm performance. Inside equity holders are mainly CEOs, 
officers, or directors, Demsetz (1983) and Fama, et al. (1983) suggested that there is a 
positive relationship between an inside ownership and corporate performance. Dan 
(2003) results illustrated relatively low relationships between various categories of equity 
concentration and multiple indicators of financial performance. 
Shahid, et al. (2004) concluded that the family control have positive effect on firm 
performance. Miller, et al. (2007) confirmed the difficulty of attributing superior 
performance to a particular governance variable. Older firms are generally family-
controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. The 
positive abnormal returns are greater for family controlled firms [Walid, et al. (2006)]. 
Significant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families [Stijn, et 
al. (2000)]. Pakistani market is also characterised with the concept of dominance of 
family business where they developed as group and their performance is distinguish from 
the firms which are not under any group as observed in Japan. [Nishat, et al. (2004)]. 
 
HISTORY OF BANKING SECTOR AND CORPORATE  
GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN 
Over the past two decades, financial sector in Pakistan had undergone a 
phenomenon changes. The transformation is taken place by introducing financial reforms 
in this country. These financial reforms play a significant role in the growth of this sector. 
Privatisation, restructuring of state owned banks, merger and acquisitions of private and 
foreign banks and introduction of Islamic banks have changed the governance structure 
of banking sector substantially. Before these reforms, financial sector in Pakistan mainly 
considered as a government sector. More than 90 percent market share was owned by 
state owned banks. These banks served as a tool to implement the government 
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development strategy. In 1972, all commercial banks had been nationalised expect few 
foreign banks. These foreign banks could not expand their operations due to strong 
regulations. These banks were used to give credit to the preferred sectors of the economy 
and also loans were given on the political basis. Initially, the arrangement gave good 
results but it did not sustain longer. The inefficiency of the banking sector observed 
shortly due to bad and influential governance by the government authorities. The 
proportion of non- performing loans were increasing day by day which results in high 
default rates of state owned banks.  
The situation was realised shortly and new financial reforms introduced by State 
Bank of Pakistan in early 1990. The objective of these reforms was to strengthen the 
financial institutions by adopting the liberalisation policy in prudential regulations. The 
primary justification to introduce these reforms has been the potential to eliminate 
systematic sources of inefficiencies in the banking sector. Not only the inefficiencies but 
also to improve the governance structure of this sector. 
In First part of these liberalisations and reforms, ten new private banks were 
permitted to start their operation in early 1990s. Apart from domestic private banks, three 
foreign banks were also permitted to start their operation in the same period. As a part of 
these reforms, the control on opening new bank branches by private and foreign banks 
was also lifted. At the same time, privatisation of state owned banks also took place by 
selling 26 percent shares of Muslim Commercial Banks to the private sector, 50 percent 
to the general public and remaining 24 percent also sold in 2001-02. Similarly, the 
privatisation of ABL, UBL and HBL were also taken place. Mass privatisation of state 
owned banks led to their market share down to 20 percent in 2005 as compared to 70 
percent in 1990. 
Secondly, state owned banks had also undergone through huge structural changes 
and downsizing. A fund was provided by the World Bank to state owned bank for their 
restructuring and downsizing in 1997. A large number of employees were voluntarily 
resigned from the banks under the golden shake hand scheme. Also, number of branches 
of state owned banks which were not performing well was also closed down.    
Finally, the governance of banking sector in Pakistan was influenced by merger 
and acquisitions of some private and foreign banks. New policy introduced by State Bank 
of Pakistan has also encouraged merger and acquisition of small and struggling private 
and foreign banks by their financially superior counterparts. As a result, in a period of 
five years from 2000–2005, 12 banks are merged and acquired out of which nine foreign 
banks are acquired by the domestic private banks.  
During this period, Islamic banking are also introduced by private and foreign 
banks in Pakistan. Initially, few Islamic banks are operated with a very little market 
share. But in very short period of time Islamic banking assets reaches to 411 billion with 
a massive growth rate of 6.1 percent.  The investors are willing to invest in Islamic Banks 
rather than the conventional banks due to its strong governance structure. Pakistan has 
adopted an unusual three-tier Shari’a-compliance structure to ensure ―deep and 
extensive‖ supervision of Shari’a compliance. The structure consists of the following 
components; (1) internal Shari’a advisers for Islamic banks, (2) a national Shari’a-
complaince inspection unit, and (3) a national Shari’a advisory board established by the 
State Bank of Pakistan, the central bank [Akhtar (2006)]. 
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The banking sector in Pakistan enjoyed healthy returns and achieved high growth 
after making necessary adjustment in their corporate governance structure. More liberal 
but concerned governance structure is established in this sector. No more political 
influence, corruption and unnecessary control of government are there. This strong 
corporate governance structure protects the right of shareholder’s which enhances the 
confidence of external investor.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTIONS 
The performance of conventional and Islamic banks can be compared by their 
accounting returns and efficiencies. The analysis is conducted in two parts in first 
part the study makes a comparison between the average return on equity, return on 
assets, technical efficiency, allocative efficiency and cost efficiency of both 
segments. In second part, the impact of macroeconomic and corporate governance 
variables is observed on the performance of conventional and Islamic banks by using 
multiple regression models. 
The annual returns on equity and returns on asset are collected from the 
financial statements of all conventional and Islamic banks for the period of 2003–
2009. The selection of sample period is very critical because before 2003 there were 
no existence of Islamic banking in Pakistan. This study includes only those 
conventional banks who are not dealing in Islamic operations. The annual returns of  
all non Islamic conventional and Islamic banks are collected for the said sample 
period.  By doing this, a cross sectional data stream is formed. The average returns of 
non Islamic conventional and Islamic banks are calculated and compared with 
independent t-sample test and find out any significance difference between them. The 
efficiencies of the selected sample banks are estimated by using the Data 
Envelopment Analysis for the same sample period. Deposits and net assets are taken 
as input variables while loans and advances and net investment as output variable for 
the purpose of estimating efficiencies of the banks.     
In second part of the analysis, the impact of macroeconomic and corporate 
governance variables on the performance of these banks is studied by applying multiple 
regression models.  
For This purpose, GDP growth rates and annual interest rates are collected from 
State Bank Pakistan as two macroeconomic variables for the period of 2003–2009. The 
corporate governance variable is added as a dummy variable in the models which 
indicates the presence of Shari’a Board in the bank. Following are the suggested models 
for this study. 
Model – 1 ROE = 1 + 1GDP(G) + 1INT + 1CG +  
Model – 2  ROA = 2 + 2GDP(G) + 2INT + 2CG +  
Model –3 TE = 3 + 2GDP(G) + 3INT + 3CG +  
Model – 4  AE = 4 + 4GDP(G) + 4INT + 4CG +  
Model – 5 CE = 5 + 5GDP(G) + 5INT + 5CG +  
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Dependent Variables           Independent Variables 
Average Return on Equity = ROE GDP Growth Rate = GDP(G) 
Average Return on Asset = ROA Annual Interest Rate = INT 
Average Technical Efficiency   = TE Corporate Governance  = CG  
Average Allocative Efficiency  = AE 
Average Cost Efficiency = CE 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In the first part of analysis, average returns of equity and returns of assets are 
compared for conventional and Islamic banks of Pakistan. 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of Means of Performance Variables of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
 Conventional Banks Islamic Banks   
Items Mean SD Mean SD t-Stat P-Value 
ROA 1.50 0.32 1.39 0.25 0.67  0.51  
ROE 20.89 4.77 13.34 2.03 3.85   0.00***  
TE 0.85 0.04 0.65 0.14 3.56   0.00***  
AE 0.52 0.18 0.58 0.17 (0.70) 0.50  
CE 0.53 0.14 0.51 0.09 0.29  0.77  
Note: ***Significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent of significance. 
 
The results show that the average return on asset for conventional banks is 1.50 
whereas the average return on asset for Islamic banks is 1.39. The p-value shows that 
there is no significant difference in average return on asset between conventional and 
Islamic banks. 
 
Graph 1-1. Comparison between Average ROA of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
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The average return on equity for conventional banks is 20.89 while for Islamic 
banks it is 13.34. The p-value of average return on equity is highly significant at 1, 5 and 
10 percent level of significance. As show in graph 1-2, the trend of average return on 
equity is declining in later for both segments. 
 
Graph 1-2. Comparison between Average ROE of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
 
 
The average technical efficiency of conventional banks is 0.85 which is very much 
close with the world average banking efficiency i.e., 0.86. In case of Islamic banks 
average technical efficiency, it is 0.65. The p-value indicates that there is a highly 
significant difference between average technical efficiency of conventional and Islamic 
banks. The following graph shows the average technical efficiencies of conventional and 
Islamic banks over the sample period.  It is clearly shown here that in the initial years 
Islamic banks technical efficiency was far behind as compared to conventional banks but 
in later years the Islamic banks technical efficiency approaches to conventional banks 
efficiency. 
 
Graph 1-3. Comparison between Average TE of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
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The average allocative efficiency of Islamic banks is 0.58 while for conventional 
banks it is 0.52. The p-value shows that there is no significant difference between average 
allocative efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks. 
 
Graph 1-4. Comparison between Average AE of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
 
 
In case of cost efficiency, the average score for Islamic banks is 0.51 whereas for 
conventional banks it is 0.53. The test of significance shows that there is no significant 
difference between average score of cost efficiencies of Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
Graph 1-5. Comparison between Average CE of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
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In second part of analysis, multiple regression models are applied to estimate the 
impact of macroeconomic and corporate governance variables on the performance of 
conventional and Islamic banks. For this purpose, five multiple regression models are 
constructed which cover two accounting performance indicators, return on equity and 
return on assets and three efficiency performance indicators such as technical efficiency, 
allocative efficiency and cost efficiency. 
 
Table 2 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
 R square Test Statistics P-Value Durban Watson Standard Error 
Model - 1       ROE      
Overall Model 0.62 5.46 (0.01**) 1.03 3.69 
Growth Rate  –0.362 –.258 (.72)  0.71 
Interest Rate  –1.17 –.647 (0.27)  0.55 
Corporate Governance  –3.8 –7.54 (0.00***)  1.97 
Model - 2      ROA      
Overall Model 0.24 1.04 0.417 2.37 0.28 
Growth Rate  –0.973 –0.053 (0.35)  0.06 
Interest Rate  –1.610 –.068 (0.14)  0.04 
Corporate Governance  –0.689 –.104 (0.51)  0.15 
Model - 3        TE      
Overall Model 0.73 8.85 (0.00***) 1.15 0.08 
Growth Rate  1.84 .030 (0.09*)  0.02 
Interest Rate  2.78 –.035 (0.02**)  0.01 
Corporate Governance  –4.3 –.19 (0.00***)  0.05 
Model - 4       AE      
Overall Model 0.38 2.06 (0.17) 2.39 0.15 
Growth Rate  0.97 .03 (0.35)  0.03 
Interest Rate  2.21 .51 (0.05*)  0.02 
Corporate Governance  0.797 .066 (0.44)  0.08 
Model - 5       CE      
Overall Model 0.13 0.5 (0.69) 2.69 0.12 
Growth Rate  0.878 .021 (.40)  0.02 
Interest Rate  1.18 .022 (0.26)  0.02 
Corporate Governance  –0.287 –.019 (0.78)  0.07 
Note:  *Significant at 10 percent level of significance. 
         **Significant at 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance. 
       ***Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance. 
 
The results show that the model 1 is highly significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
of significance. R
2
 for model 1 is 0.62 and standard error is 3.69 percent. The coefficients 
of GDP growth rate and interest rates are –.258 and –.647 respectively and both are 
insignificant. The coefficient of corporate governance is –7.54 and it is highly significant 
at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance. This means the presence of Shari’a board in 
governing body of a bank affects the return on equity of the banks. 
In model 2, R
2
 is 0.24 and standard error is 0.28 percent. The overall model is 
insignificant. The coefficients of GDP growth rate, interest rate and corporate governance 
variables are –.05, –.068 and –.104 respectively. All the coefficients of independent 
variables are insignificant in model 2. 
Similarly, the overall model 4 and 5 are also insignificant. The result suggests that 
there is no impact of macroeconomic and corporate governance on allocative and cost 
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efficiencies of conventional and Islamic banks. In model 4, the coefficient of interest rate 
is 0.51 and is significant at 10 percent level of significance.   
The results of model 3 suggest that the overall model is highly significant at 1, 5 
and 10 percent level of significance. The R
2 
and standard error of model 3 are 0.73 and 
0.08 respectively. The coefficient of GDP growth rate is 0.03 and significant at 10 
percent level of significance. The coefficient of interest rate is –.035 and it is significant 
at 5 and 10 percent level of significance. While the coefficient of corporate governance 
variable is –0.19 and it is highly significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance.    
 
CONCLUSION 
When an investor feels himself more secure, he will invest more. For making the 
firm more profitable, one should protect the rights of the investor. This can only be 
happen if the firm has strong corporate governance structure. In this case, banking sector 
in Pakistan was influenced by the government authorities with weak governance which 
results in a low performing sector, but after making the necessary changes in the 
governance structure the very sector evident a phenomenon growth and high returns in it. 
We believe there are still some gaps left in the governance structure of the banking sector 
in Pakistan, but these gaps will fill up by the Islamic Banks due to their more reliable 
governance structure.  
The results of this study suggest that there is a significant role of corporate governance 
in the performance of banking sector of Pakistan either it is conventional or Islamic. There is a 
clear indication that the presence of Shari’a board affects the return on equity and technical 
efficiency of banking sector. This is a preliminary level effort in this regard. The study can be 
extended by adding more complex variables of corporate governance and observe their 
influences on the performance of banking sector in Pakistan.    
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